备份iPhone到移动硬盘

直接上干货:

  • 把iPhone和移动硬盘插到电脑上
  • 在Finder里看一下移动硬盘的名字,建议把名字修改成简单的不带空格和特殊符号的英文名,方便后续步骤在Terminal中使用,比如叫BackupDriver
  • 先把原有的备份目录复制出来,以防万一
    • 在Spotlight(点屏幕右上角的放大镜)中输入~/Library/Application Support/MobileSync然后回车
    • 把打开的文件夹里的Backup目录复制粘贴到要备份的地方
    • 确保Backup目录已完全备份完毕,然后把这个文件夹删掉
  • 点屏幕左上角的苹果图标,下拉菜单中点System Preferences
  • 弹出窗口中点Security & Privacy
  • 在Privacy标签卡下左侧列表中找到并点击Full Disk Access
  • 看看右边窗口中有没有Terminal并且被勾选
  • 如果没有则按下面步骤添加一下
    • 点一下Security & Privacy窗口左下角的锁,输入电脑登录密码之后解锁
    • 在Privacy标签卡窗口右侧列表下点+号
    • 在弹出窗口右上角的搜索栏中输入terminal,选中搜索结果里的Terminal(黑色图标)应用然后点Open
  • 确保Privacy窗口右侧列表中已有Terminal并且被选中后关闭Security & Privacy窗口
  • 打开Terminal(可以在Spotlight中直接输入terminal然后回车)
  • 把下面BackupDriver改为移动硬盘名,iPhoneBackup是在移动硬盘上的备份目录名,没有就新建一个,保持目录名和这里的命令中的一致,然后在Terminal中执行
ln -s /Volumes/BackupDriver/iPhoneBackup ~/Library/Application\ Support/MobileSync/Backup

注:以上Application Support中间的空格前一定要加一个斜线\,不然Terminal会认为路径到空格那里就结束了

不出错的话就可以正常在Finders里点开已连接的手机,再点Back Up Now进行备份了。


我的MacBook Pro硬盘只有500G,而iPhone也是500G,所以手机买来好几年都没有在电脑上备份过,iCloud也早满了也不想花钱买更多的空间。于是Google了一下如何备份到移动硬盘上。

实际上系统里本身不支持更改备份路径,这个方法就是给默认的备份目录建立了一个symlink,链接到了移动硬盘上。对于系统来说备份路径没变。

当然这样的话如果你不插上同一块硬盘的情况下,是不能在电脑上完成备份的。

如果要换另一块硬盘来备份,则把前面在~/Library/Application Support/MobileSync/里建立的那个symlink(在Finder中显示为左下角带个箭头的文件夹图标)删掉,然后重新建立一个链接到新硬盘里相应路径下的symlink就可以。

与极客交朋友

极客是一群社交能力比较弱的人,同时他们又是不甘心于任何不足、缺陷的人,所以他们靠算法搞定社交,整出各种社交网站和应用来颠覆你们这些社交能力强的人的世界。现在你们完了,以前你们玩什么都不带上极客,不光爱理不理的,甚至常常有嘲笑、愚弄极客们的现象,可如今你们的世界已经被极客们征服,你们的社交已经完全离不开极客们创造的工具,你们不得不开始膜拜极客们,你们需要学习如何跟极客交朋友。

极客分两类,一类由geek这个单词的本意演变而来,一类由极客精神引申而来。

第一类描述的人群比较窄,geek本来的意思是不寻常的、古怪的人,通常是令人讨厌的,以前当人们说一个人很geeky的时候是带着鄙夷的,类似于中国人常说的书呆子。可是随着这些呆子们用facebook、twitter、foursquare、instagram、line、vine、path、tesla等等一次次地对这个世界做出改变的时候,这个单词的释义慢慢由贬义转向褒义了,出现了电脑高手、技术高手、追求极致等等的意思。这类极客总体上还是跟技术,尤其是计算机技术相关的,所以人群还比较小。

第二类就是在极客们的那种不甘于平庸、不完美而追求极致,用行动对这个世界做出改变的精神气质上扩展开来的人群。这样极客这个称号就不仅仅被限制在技术方面了,如果你是个烹饪高手,不断做出创新你就是极客;如果你是个艺术家,用不同于寻常的方式创作你也是极客;即使你仅仅是在街上摆摊的,但你用了独到的方式来经营你的小买卖进而引起了轰动,你同样是个极客。这样极客的人群就扩大到了各行各业了,极客就是在各个领域里的那一批人,他们不满足于现状,不断发现周围世界的不足然后用极致的方式进行改造。

极客所涵盖的人群再广也改变不了他们是小众的事实,因为大众之所以是大众就是因为他们只希望能享受少数人努力带来的改变。而人的本性就是懒惰的,极客们就是被选中的那少数能克服懒惰,比大众多迈出了一步的人——他们不仅仅是想到这个世界应当要有什么改变,而且会付诸行动亲手来进行改造。

了解了极客才有可能跟他们交朋友。

  • 极客们很专注,因此不希望被打扰,所以不要拿无聊的琐事去烦他们,他们不会鸟你;
  • 不要去忽悠他们,因为他们的智商通常都很高,你忽悠他们的时候他们只是为了不伤你的面子不给你点破而已;
  • 发自内心地尊重他们,因为有了他们我们的世界才变得越来越用户友好,你仅仅是支付了钱是无法跟他们所做出的改变背后的意义相提并论的;
  • 极客们不喜欢说太多,只喜欢做更多,他们这样要求自己,也同样要求自己的朋友,你想做他们的朋友就尽量用行动来表示,他们对只有言语而没有实质行动的现象都会在自己的社交公式里给化掉的,在他们眼里不存在;
  • 极客们很注意谈话与思考的逻辑,他们倾向于只给你逻辑清晰地描绘一次他们的想法就够了,如果你不能很快明白,他们会找各种借口来远离你;
  • 极客们不太懂得站在别人的立场考虑问题(主要是不愿意),在他们眼中你就是一个黑匣子,跟他们交流只需要提供几个API接口进行高效的信息置换就可以,他们才懒得管你内部如何处理呢,他们认为那是你自己应当搞定的事……

其实最好的一种方式,就是你也成为一个极客,不仅仅幻想这个世界应当有什么改进的地方,更是拿出行动来改造这个世界,你就能真正理解极客并且成为极客们的好朋友了。

中本聪(Satoshi Nakamoto)关于比特币的那篇论文

今天上午在BTCChina上比特币一度涨到了2600多,一个多月前抱着试试看的心态,充了2500块钱开始玩,那时候才六百多一个比特币,虽然有点遗憾当初没多买点,但是也要保持理性,上午在2500的时候卖出一个之后把2500块钱提现。用帐户余额继续玩。这样即使将来亏完了,于我实际也没有什么影响,我的2500反正已经收回来了。

听说比特币多半年的时间了,但还没真正专心钻研过,所以先把这个发明的源头找到,一点点学习。搜到了比特币的发明者中本聪(Satoshi Nakamoto)的那篇论文,要是能弄明白,有空闲的话我试试看能不能把这篇论文给翻译一下。

Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System

Satoshi Nakamoto
[email protected]
www.bitcoin.org
Abstract. A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they’ll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers. The network itself requires minimal structure. Messages are broadcast on a best effort basis, and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the longest proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone.

1. Introduction

Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model. Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases transaction costs, limiting the minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions, and there is a broader cost in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for non- reversible services. With the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads. Merchants must be wary of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise need. A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable. These costs and payment uncertainties can be avoided in person by using physical currency, but no mechanism exists to make payments over a communications channel without a trusted party.
What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party. Transactions that are computationally impractical to reverse would protect sellers from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented to protect buyers. In this paper, we propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server to generate computational proof of the chronological order of transactions. The system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes.

2. Transactions

We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding these to the end of the coin. A payee can verify the signatures to verify the chain of ownership.
Transactions
The problem of course is the payee can’t verify that one of the owners did not double-spend the coin. A common solution is to introduce a trusted central authority, or mint, that checks every transaction for double spending. After each transaction, the coin must be returned to the mint to issue a new coin, and only coins issued directly from the mint are trusted not to be double-spent. The problem with this solution is that the fate of the entire money system depends on the company running the mint, with every transaction having to go through them, just like a bank.
We need a way for the payee to know that the previous owners did not sign any earlier transactions. For our purposes, the earliest transaction is the one that counts, so we don’t care about later attempts to double-spend. The only way to confirm the absence of a transaction is to be aware of all transactions. In the mint based model, the mint was aware of all transactions and decided which arrived first. To accomplish this without a trusted party, transactions must be publicly announced [1], and we need a system for participants to agree on a single history of the order in which they were received. The payee needs proof that at the time of each transaction, the majority of nodes agreed it was the first received.

3. Timestamp Server

The solution we propose begins with a timestamp server. A timestamp server works by taking a hash of a block of items to be timestamped and widely publishing the hash, such as in a newspaper or Usenet post [2-5]. The timestamp proves that the data must have existed at the time, obviously, in order to get into the hash. Each timestamp includes the previous timestamp in its hash, forming a chain, with each additional timestamp reinforcing the ones before it.
TimestampServer

4. Proof-of-Work

To implement a distributed timestamp server on a peer-to-peer basis, we will need to use a proof- of-work system similar to Adam Back’s Hashcash [6], rather than newspaper or Usenet posts. The proof-of-work involves scanning for a value that when hashed, such as with SHA-256, the hash begins with a number of zero bits. The average work required is exponential in the number of zero bits required and can be verified by executing a single hash.
For our timestamp network, we implement the proof-of-work by incrementing a nonce in the block until a value is found that gives the block’s hash the required zero bits. Once the CPU effort has been expended to make it satisfy the proof-of-work, the block cannot be changed without redoing the work. As later blocks are chained after it, the work to change the block would include redoing all the blocks after it.
Proof-of-work
The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining representation in majority decision making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it could be subverted by anyone able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote. The majority decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an attacker would have to redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then catch up with and surpass the work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a slower attacker catching up diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added.
To compensate for increasing hardware speed and varying interest in running nodes over time, the proof-of-work difficulty is determined by a moving average targeting an average number of blocks per hour. If they’re generated too fast, the difficulty increases.

5. Network

The steps to run the network are as follows:

  1. New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.
  2. Each node collects new transactions into a block.
  3. Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block.
  4. When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes.
  5. Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent.
  6. Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous hash.

Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will keep working on extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions of the next block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received, but save the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when the next proof- of-work is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that were working on the other branch will then switch to the longer one.
New transaction broadcasts do not necessarily need to reach all nodes. As long as they reach many nodes, they will get into a block before long. Block broadcasts are also tolerant of dropped messages. If a node does not receive a block, it will request it when it receives the next block and realizes it missed one.

6. Incentive

By convention, the first transaction in a block is a special transaction that starts a new coin owned by the creator of the block. This adds an incentive for nodes to support the network, and provides a way to initially distribute coins into circulation, since there is no central authority to issue them. The steady addition of a constant of amount of new coins is analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation. In our case, it is CPU time and electricity that is expended.
The incentive can also be funded with transaction fees. If the output value of a transaction is less than its input value, the difference is a transaction fee that is added to the incentive value of the block containing the transaction. Once a predetermined number of coins have entered circulation, the incentive can transition entirely to transaction fees and be completely inflation free.
The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.

7. Reclaiming Disk Space

Once the latest transaction in a coin is buried under enough blocks, the spent transactions before it can be discarded to save disk space. To facilitate this without breaking the block’s hash, transactions are hashed in a Merkle Tree [7][2][5], with only the root included in the block’s hash. Old blocks can then be compacted by stubbing off branches of the tree. The interior hashes do not need to be stored.
ReclaimingDiskSpace
A block header with no transactions would be about 80 bytes. If we suppose blocks are generated every 10 minutes, 80 bytes * 6 * 24 * 365 = 4.2MB per year. With computer systems typically selling with 2GB of RAM as of 2008, and Moore’s Law predicting current growth of 1.2GB per year, storage should not be a problem even if the block headers must be kept in memory.

8. Simplified Payment Verification

It is possible to verify payments without running a full network node. A user only needs to keep a copy of the block headers of the longest proof-of-work chain, which he can get by querying network nodes until he’s convinced he has the longest chain, and obtain the Merkle branch linking the transaction to the block it’s timestamped in. He can’t check the transaction for himself, but by linking it to a place in the chain, he can see that a network node has accepted it, and blocks added after it further confirm the network has accepted it.
SimplifiedPaymentVerification
As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker’s fabricated transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid block, prompting the user’s software to download the full block and alerted transactions to confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification.

9. Combining and Splitting Value

Although it would be possible to handle coins individually, it would be unwieldy to make a separate transaction for every cent in a transfer. To allow value to be split and combined, transactions contain multiple inputs and outputs. Normally there will be either a single input from a larger previous transaction or multiple inputs combining smaller amounts, and at most two outputs: one for the payment, and one returning the change, if any, back to the sender.
CombiningAndSplittingValue
It should be noted that fan-out, where a transaction depends on several transactions, and those transactions depend on many more, is not a problem here. There is never the need to extract a complete standalone copy of a transaction’s history.

10. Privacy

The traditional banking model achieves a level of privacy by limiting access to information to the parties involved and the trusted third party. The necessity to announce all transactions publicly precludes this method, but privacy can still be maintained by breaking the flow of information in another place: by keeping public keys anonymous. The public can see that someone is sending an amount to someone else, but without information linking the transaction to anyone. This is similar to the level of information released by stock exchanges, where the time and size of individual trades, the “tape”, is made public, but without telling who the parties were.
Privacy
As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the same owner.

11. Calculations

We consider the scenario of an attacker trying to generate an alternate chain faster than the honest chain. Even if this is accomplished, it does not throw the system open to arbitrary changes, such as creating value out of thin air or taking money that never belonged to the attacker. Nodes are not going to accept an invalid transaction as payment, and honest nodes will never accept a block containing them. An attacker can only try to change one of his own transactions to take back money he recently spent.
The race between the honest chain and an attacker chain can be characterized as a Binomial Random Walk. The success event is the honest chain being extended by one block, increasing its lead by +1, and the failure event is the attacker’s chain being extended by one block, reducing the gap by -1.
The probability of an attacker catching up from a given deficit is analogous to a Gambler’s Ruin problem. Suppose a gambler with unlimited credit starts at a deficit and plays potentially an infinite number of trials to try to reach breakeven. We can calculate the probability he ever reaches breakeven, or that an attacker ever catches up with the honest chain, as follows [8]:
p = probability an honest node finds the next block
q = probability the attacker finds the next block
qz = probability the attacker will ever catch up from z blocks behind
Calculations1
Given our assumption that p > q, the probability drops exponentially as the number of blocks the attacker has to catch up with increases. With the odds against him, if he doesn’t make a lucky lunge forward early on, his chances become vanishingly small as he falls further behind.
We now consider how long the recipient of a new transaction needs to wait before being sufficiently certain the sender can’t change the transaction. We assume the sender is an attacker who wants to make the recipient believe he paid him for a while, then switch it to pay back to himself after some time has passed. The receiver will be alerted when that happens, but the sender hopes it will be too late.
The receiver generates a new key pair and gives the public key to the sender shortly before signing. This prevents the sender from preparing a chain of blocks ahead of time by working on it continuously until he is lucky enough to get far enough ahead, then executing the transaction at that moment. Once the transaction is sent, the dishonest sender starts working in secret on a parallel chain containing an alternate version of his transaction.
The recipient waits until the transaction has been added to a block and z blocks have been linked after it. He doesn’t know the exact amount of progress the attacker has made, but assuming the honest blocks took the average expected time per block, the attacker’s potential progress will be a Poisson distribution with expected value:
Calculations2
To get the probability the attacker could still catch up now, we multiply the Poisson density for each amount of progress he could have made by the probability he could catch up from that point:
Calculations3
Rearranging to avoid summing the infinite tail of the distribution…
Calculations4
Converting to C code…

#include <math.h>
   double AttackerSuccessProbability(double q, int z)
   {
       double p = 1.0 - q;
       double lambda = z * (q / p);
       double sum = 1.0;
       int i, k;
       for (k = 0; k <= z; k++)
       {
           double poisson = exp(-lambda);
           for (i = 1; i <= k; i++)
poisson *= lambda / i;
           sum -= poisson * (1 - pow(q / p, z - k));
       }
       return sum;
   }

Running some results, we can see the probability drop off exponentially with z.

   q=0.1
   z=0    P=1.0000000
   z=1    P=0.2045873
   z=2    P=0.0509779
   z=3    P=0.0131722
   z=4    P=0.0034552
   z=5    P=0.0009137
   z=6    P=0.0002428
   z=7    P=0.0000647
   z=8    P=0.0000173
   z=9    P=0.0000046
   z=10   P=0.0000012
   q=0.3
   z=0    P=1.0000000
   z=5    P=0.1773523
   z=10   P=0.0416605
   z=15   P=0.0101008
   z=20   P=0.0024804
   z=25   P=0.0006132
   z=30   P=0.0001522
   z=35   P=0.0000379
   z=40   P=0.0000095
   z=45   P=0.0000024
   z=50   P=0.0000006
Solving for P less than 0.1%…

   P < 0.001
   q=0.10   z=5
   q=0.15   z=8
   q=0.20   z=11
   q=0.25   z=15
   q=0.30   z=24
   q=0.35   z=41
   q=0.40   z=89
   q=0.45   z=340
12. Conclusion

We have proposed a system for electronic transactions without relying on trust. We started with the usual framework of coins made from digital signatures, which provides strong control of ownership, but is incomplete without a way to prevent double-spending. To solve this, we proposed a peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a public history of transactions that quickly becomes computationally impractical for an attacker to change if honest nodes control a majority of CPU power. The network is robust in its unstructured simplicity. Nodes work all at once with little coordination. They do not need to be identified, since messages are not routed to any particular place and only need to be delivered on a best effort basis. Nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone. They vote with their CPU power, expressing their acceptance of valid blocks by working on extending them and rejecting invalid blocks by refusing to work on them. Any needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism.
References
[1] W. Dai, “b-money,” http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt, 1998.
[2] H. Massias, X.S. Avila, and J.-J. Quisquater, “Design of a secure timestamping service with minimal trust requirements,” In 20th Symposium on Information Theory in the Benelux, May 1999.
[3] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, “How to time-stamp a digital document,” In Journal of Cryptology, vol 3, no 2, pages 99-111, 1991.
[4] D. Bayer, S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, “Improving the efficiency and reliability of digital time-stamping,” In Sequences II: Methods in Communication, Security and Computer Science, pages 329-334, 1993.
[5] S. Haber, W.S. Stornetta, “Secure names for bit-strings,” In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 28-35, April 1997.
[6] A. Back, “Hashcash – a denial of service counter-measure,” http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf, 2002.
[7] R.C. Merkle, “Protocols for public key cryptosystems,” In Proc. 1980 Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE Computer Society, pages 122-133, April 1980.
[8] W. Feller, “An introduction to probability theory and its applications,” 1957.

BigBlueButton录像文件太多,Ubuntu Server硬盘不够怎么办?

使用BigBlueButton时开启了录制功能,时间一久就发现空间不够用了,于是先用最基本的操作,删掉已外理过的录音文件来清理出空间:

1. 清理Log
  sudo bbb-conf –clean
2.  删除旧的录像、文档、
   /etc/cron.daily/bigbluebutton
删除 `exit 0` 行来启用自动清理
清理项有:
find /var/bigbluebutton -maxdepth 1 -type d -name “*-*” -mtime +11 -exec rm -r ‘{}’ \;
find /usr/share/red5/webapps/video/streams -name “*.flv” -mtime +1 -exec rm ‘{}’ \;
find /var/bigbluebutton/deskshare -name “*.flv” -mtime +1 -exec rm ‘{}’ \;
find /var/freeswitch/meetings -name “*.wav” -mtime +1 -exec rm ‘{}’ \;
3.  删除已处理过的wav文件
sudo find /var/bigbluebutton/recording/process -name “*.wav” -exec rm ‘{}’ \;
这样做了之后能撑一段时间,可是时间久了又不够了,第一个念头就是加一块硬盘,然后把BigBlueButton默认的录像存放路径修改到新的硬盘上。
由于BigBlueButton本身没有提供修改录像文件路径的命令,于是我把BigBlueButton录制、处理、存储、回放的整个过程都详细研究了一遍,把这个过程中我认为所有涉及到路径的代码都给改了,可是最终还是不成功,实在找不出问题出在哪里,只能放弃了这个方案。不过可以把这个过程先记录下来,以做参考,想看较为可行的方案的可以跳过这部分:

录像与回放功能目录结构

/usr/local/bigbluebutton/
└── core
    ├── Gemfile
    ├── Gemfile.lock
    ├── lib
    │   ├── recordandplayback
    │   │   ├── audio_archiver.rb
    │   │   ├── deskshare_archiver.rb
    │   │   ├── events_archiver.rb
    │   │   ├── generators
    │   │   │   ├── audio_processor.rb
    │   │   │   ├── audio.rb
    │   │   │   ├── events.rb
    │   │   │   ├── matterhorn_processor.rb
    │   │   │   ├── presentation.rb
    │   │   │   └── video.rb
    │   │   ├── presentation_archiver.rb
    │   │   └── video_archiver.rb
    │   └── recordandplayback.rb
    └── scripts
        ├── archive
        │   └── archive.rb
        ├── bbb-rap.sh
        ├── bigbluebutton.yml
        ├── cleanup.rb
        ├── process
        │   ├── README
        │   └── slides.rb
        ├── publish
        │   ├── README
        │   └── slides.rb
        ├── rap-worker.rb
        └── slides.yml

最终录像回放存放目录

  • /var/bigbluebutton/published/slides/<meeting-id> 
修改录像与回放目录:
把原有的录像路径下所有文件与目录拷到目标路径,如/mnt下
sudo cp -a /var/bigbluebutton /mnt/
则新的录像与回放目录为:/mnt/bigbluebutton

sudo vi /usr/local/bigbluebutton/core/scripts/slides.yml

修改其中的publish_dir
sudo vi /usr/local/bigbluebutton/core/scripts/bigbluebutton.yml
修改其中的recording_dir published_dir raw_deskshare_src raw_presentation_src
sudo vi /usr/local/bigbluebutton/core/scripts/cleanup.rb
修改其中的PUBLISHED_DIR UNPUBLISHED_DIR RECORDING_DIR
sudo vi /var/lib/tomcat6/webapps/bigbluebutton/WEB-INF/classes/bigbluebutton.properties
修改其中的presentationDir BLANK_SLIDE BLANK_THUMBNAIL recordStatusDir publishedDir unpublishedDir
使用下面这条命令前先把地址修改为想要修改的地址,以便网络用户有权限访问该位置的内容
sudo chown -R tomcat6:tomcat6 /mnt/bigbluebutton/playback/
sudo vi /etc/bigbluebutton/nginx/slides.nginx
修改其中的地址
sudo chown tomcat6 /mnt/bigbluebutton
修改目录所有者
sudo bbb-conf –clean
折腾了半天,结果还是无法正常录像,重启服务器也没用,只能换个思路了。左思右想,想出了这么一个办法:
  1. 把 /var/bigbluebutton目录内的文件移动到别处
  2. 新增一块硬盘挂载到/var/bigbluebutton目录
  3. 用ls -ld /var/bigbluebutton查看一下目录权限,所有者是否为tomcat6
  4. 如果不是则修改为tomcat6
  5. 把移到别处的文件拷回/var/bigbluebutton下
  6. 在sudo vi /etc/fstab中新建条目以便每次重启时自动加载

附上挂新硬盘的方法:

查看移动硬盘
sudo fdisk -l
挂载
sudo mount -t ext4 /dev/sdb1 /var/bigbluebutton
注:如果是fat32格式的则用-t vfat参数,如果是ext3格式的则用-t ext3参数,/dev/sdb1改为你要挂载的硬盘的实际名称
设置重启后自动挂载
sudo vi /etc/fstab
在该文件中添加:
/dev/sdb1        /var/bigbluebutton       ext4    defaults        0       0

由于BigBlueButton当前版本对于录像的存储、发布等功能还是非常不完善,只能先这样处理了。

当硬盘再次满了的时候还会面临新的问题。再加一块的话要么加一块更大的硬盘,把原有的录像文件复制到新的硬盘上;要么就制定一个规则,把超过一定时间的录像文件删掉,腾出新的空间来用。

四千多条短信啊,总算从iPhone成功转移到i9108了!

你是不是也弄不清楚G3与3G?你是不是也不知道移动的3G如何办理?你是不是也不知道3G、G3、GPRS的区别?你是不是也不知道iPhone里如何备份短信到网络上(云端)?你是不是也……?这些问题我都产生过,下面就分享一下我的探索过程吧:

2008年初买的iPhone一直用到现在。从一拿出来人们就投来好奇的眼光,直到现在拿出来人们都不认识,说你这是山寨的吧。最终下定决心了,要换个新手机。iPhone 4S呢不太想买,有点期望iPhone 5,但iPhone 5还不知道什么时候才会有呢。另外在现在智能手机的大潮中,另外半壁江山我不能一无所知啊,得用个Android的手机才行。我可不是果粉,非要追着苹果才行。于是周六晚上三星Galaxy S II(i9108)到手上了。折腾了两天,目前感受是硬件比iPhone好,系统比iPhone差远了(主要指用户友好方面)。这里主要记录期间的两大事件吧。

第一是搞清楚了一个很小白的问题。我一直没弄清楚3G与GPRS的关系。网上搜也没有太多这方面的问题。有网友问了之后甚至被很多人嘲笑。上移动的网站看(我的号是移动的),竟然也没有这些基础知识的资料。我从最早使用手机开始就一直觉得移动的网站太垃圾,几乎都不上。这么多年过去了,移动的网站依旧是风采不减。
上了移动的网站后,我更晕了,出现了另一个词“G3”。我的直觉告诉我这就是移动的3G了。然后看到有广告语说是不用换卡也不用换号,就可以使用移动的G3。于是我就试了一下,用我的S2直接上网,果然没问题,并且速度很快。原来不用设置什么啊!
但又一个问题浮现在我的脑海里了,费用怎么算啊,我可没办理G3业务啊,我可不想跟当年刚使用iPhone时那样,没有办理GPRS套餐,结果一两天就把几百块钱用没了。又上移动的网站打算办G3的套餐,结果怎么都找不到,也没有说明。再次感叹,移动的网站真垃圾,我就不相信像我这样想的人全世界就我一个!
最后,把移动的网站翻烂了都没找到办G3的地方。无可奈何,打10086问吧。话务小姐的一句话立马让我顿悟了:“3G与GPRS的区别就是一个快一个慢,用的都是GPRS的套餐。”唉,我真无语了,你把这句话放在你的网站上能费多大劲啊?我觉着吧,这些其实应该算中国移动的产品优势啊,从2G到3G,什么都不用做,换个3G的手机就可以了,如果以前上过网,连套餐都不用重新申请,多好啊。结果让我没念它的好。还搞个“G3”出来把搞晕客户更上了一层楼。

第二就是通讯录、邮箱、日历、短信的转移。前三样都很简单了,用Google的帐户在Exchange里设置同步就可以了。设置方法呢参考这里:Setting up Google Sync with your iOS device
短信的事情又颇费了一些周折。找了好多工具都是只能备份与恢复通讯录的。QQ同步助手可以导出通讯录、短信、通话记录到网络上,然后又能在别的设备里进行恢复。
先在S2上面装的,原以为没什么问题了。结果在iPhone里安装了之后发现只能同步通讯录。安装的时候明明看到说明里是能同步短信的啊。搜了一下原来Apple不允许应用程序进行这样的操作。虽然表示理解吧,但我iPhone里有四千多条短信可怎么办啊?
试过了找别的软件,都没有这个功能。
最后终于找到了一个方法,还是用QQ同步助手,但不是通过App Store安装。这个方法适用于越狱与破解了的iPhone:

1. 在Cydia里添加源:http://www.qcydia.com
2. 完成之后再找到并安装QQ同步助手

装完后一看界面,心里咯噔一下,因为跟之前看着一样,只有同步通讯录的按钮。幸好没马上退出,用手往左一划,同步短信的界面出来了。这时仔细看才发现原来有两个小点在下面,这个应用有两页。真险。设置好帐号登录后先备份,然后在S2里选择恢复。恢复完成后打开短信,没反应了,重启一下手机,终于成功了,四千多条短信成功转移到我的新手机上了!
不过这个版本的没有同步通话记录的,想了想这个无所谓了。不管了。

59259567

这个翻墙方法要记一下

速度还真快,以前以为买VPN就是最好的了,但发现买的VPN也经常出问题,所以买的几个到期后就再也没续费了。但墙内实在无聊,不得已又学会了一招,没想到不但免费的,并且速度还很快。

简单说就是利用国外免费空间的SSH来翻墙。

  1. 在Google上搜:freehost cpanel
  2. 找一个打开速度不错的注册一下
  3. 进入Cpanel后台管理界面
  4. 在左侧找到Shared IP Address,这个IP地址就是SSH登陆时使用的服务器地址
  5. 进入FTP Accounts
  6. 往下翻,找到Path为你网站根目录的那个帐户,点Configure FTP Client
  7. FTP Username就是你的SSH用户名,密码就是你自己的密码,一般是自动给你生成一个发给你,你也可以修改成自己方便记的
  8. SFTP Server Port就是SSH服务器用的端口
  9. 到此SSH需要的信息就找全了,汇总一下:服务器IP、端口、用户名、密码

接下来就可以配置SSH客户端来翻墙了。也简单记一下,以Bitvise Tunnelier为例:

  1. 下载Bitvise Tunnelier:http://www.bitvise.com/tunnelier-download
  2. 安装
  3. 运行后先配置,在Login选项卡里填入前面找到的四样信息,注意Initial Method要选择Password才会出现密码输入框,为方便起见勾选下面的Store encrypted password in profile以方便以后登陆
  4. 在Options选项卡里去掉Open Terminal与Open SFTP前面的对勾
  5. 在Services选项卡里勾选SOCKS / HTTP Proxy Fowarding下面的Enabled
  6. Listen Interface: 127.0.0.1
  7. Listen Port: 1080
  8. 点Login,连接成功后会提示要不要保存,存了吧。

 

然后在浏览器里设置代理,这个就不详说了,对了,代理的端口就是前面设置的1080,也可以自己设别的,都行。

用VPN翻墙,却遭遇DNS污染

FTP客户端的翻墙经历

由于博客被封了,一般的翻墙工具都不能支持FTP,所以Wordpress升级到了2.9.2很长时间了都没有升级。前两天用了一下张生翻墙,在FileZila里设置好代理之后可以连上我的FTP了,非常高兴,于是立即下载了2.9.2的Wordpress准备升级。这一下就闯祸了。发现上传的文件有很多都是0KB,反复上传都不行。回想起来在设置代理的时候有提示说如果设置代理,就只能用Passive模式传输文件,怀疑可能是这个原因造成的。网上搜了很多关于FTP上传文件变成0KB的问题,都没有很好的解决办法。很多都是说换个客户端,没有找到代理与FTP客户端配合使用造成文件上传为0KB的文章。于是换了好多个客户端,全都不行。

最终没有办法了,博客虽在墙外,但也不能就这样被毁了吧。于是想想,花钱消灾吧。我想买个VPN应该就没有问题了吧。于是搜了一下,在这里买了一个VPN。一个月15块钱的,担心VPN也不行,所以没有买太贵或时间长的。先花15块,不行就当个翻墙工具使也行。功夫不负有心人,成功了。跟没被墙的时候一样了。博客也活过来了,升到了最新版,觉得世界美好了许多。

遭遇DNS污染

不过事情总是不会那么顺利的。

今天上午打开电脑,连上VPN。首先出现的是我的Xmarks不能同步了,我觉得很奇怪。接着试了一下Twitter,也不行。“可能吧”也打不开。但我的博客可以打开了。是VPN不行了吗?如果是这样的话难道是我的博客解封了?后来发现都不是。就是有部分网站打不开。于是给VPN提供商发了封邮件。回信很简洁:

DNS污染,需要用Google DNS,然后浏览器要支持远程解析DNS,详情Google搜索即可。。

于是照做了,Google出一些文章看明白了DNS污染、DNS劫持是怎么一回事。我也就不多说理论了,反正Google一下会有很多文章在说的。一个很好的解决办法就是使用Google的Public DNS,在这个页面有详细的说明
这里只说一下Windows里的设置方法:
控制面板->网络连接->本地连接->属性->TCP/IP协议->属性->DNS服务器地址,输入“8.8.8.8”和 “8.8.4.4”。确定后在任务栏的网络连接图标上右击->修复,就可以了。

谷歌,墙那边再见!

真的要说再见了。不过说实话,平时上网都翻墙,几乎从来没有用过G.cn。并不想说G.cn做得不好,而是在这样的国家,你是不能期待它能做到像Google.com那样的。
Farewell! G.cn. See you on the other side of the wall!

A new approach to China: an update
对中国的新举措:更新

3/22/2010 12:03:00 PM

On January 12, we announced on this blog that Google and more than twenty other U.S. companies had been the victims of a sophisticated cyber attack originating from China, and that during our investigation into these attacks we had uncovered evidence to suggest that the Gmail accounts of dozens of human rights activists connected with China were being routinely accessed by third parties, most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on their computers. We also made clear that these attacks and the surveillance they uncovered—combined with attempts over the last year to further limit free speech on the web in China including the persistent blocking of websites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google Docs and Blogger—had led us to conclude that we could no longer continue censoring our results on Google.cn.

在1月12日,我们在这个博客上宣布Google和其它二十多家美国公遭遇到了来自中国的高手段的网络攻击。在调查这些攻击的过程中我们发现了很多证据表明大量与中国有关的人权活动家的Gmail帐户经常被第三方登入,大多像是通过钓鱼诈骗或者被置于他们电脑上的流氓软件。我们同样也表明这些攻击以及由此揭露出来的监控行为——再加上在过去的一年中为进一步限制网络言论自由而对像Facebook、Twitter、YouTube、Google Docs和Blogger进行的持续封锁——导致我们做出决定,不再对我们Google.cn上的搜索结果进行审查。

So earlier today we stopped censoring our search services—Google Search, Google News, and Google Images—on Google.cn. Users visiting Google.cn are now being redirected to Google.com.hk, where we are offering uncensored search in simplified Chinese, specifically designed for users in mainland China and delivered via our servers in Hong Kong. Users in Hong Kong will continue to receive their existing uncensored, traditional Chinese service, also from Google.com.hk. Due to the increased load on our Hong Kong servers and the complicated nature of these changes, users may see some slowdown in service or find some products temporarily inaccessible as we switch everything over.

所以,在今天早些时候我们停止了对Google.cn上的搜索服务——Google Search、Google News和Google Images——的审查。访问Google.cn的用户将会被转向Google.com.hk,在那里我们提供不经审查的简体中文搜索,通过我们在香港的服务器专门为来自中国大陆的用户服务。香港的用户将会继续收到他们原有的Google.com.hk未经审查的繁体中文服务。由于香港服务器所增加的负荷和这些变化的复杂性,在我们转移所有东西的过程中用户可能会发现服务速度有些变缓或者有些产品暂时不能访问。

Figuring out how to make good on our promise to stop censoring search on Google.cn has been hard. We want as many people in the world as possible to have access to our services, including users in mainland China, yet the Chinese government has been crystal clear throughout our discussions that self-censorship is a non-negotiable legal requirement. We believe this new approach of providing uncensored search in simplified Chinese from Google.com.hk is a sensible solution to the challenges we’ve faced—it’s entirely legal and will meaningfully increase access to information for people in China. We very much hope that the Chinese government respects our decision, though we are well aware that it could at any time block access to our services. We will therefore be carefully monitoring access issues, and have created this new web page, which we will update regularly each day, so that everyone can see which Google services are available in China.

弄清楚怎样实现我们对Google.cn的搜索不进行审查的承诺是非常艰难的。我们希望全世界更多的人能访问我们的服务,包括来自中国大陆的用户,然而中 国政府在我们谈判的过程中非常清楚地表明自我审查是一个不可谈判的我们条件。我们相信这个通过Google.com.hk提供简体中文不经审查的搜索的新举措对我们所面 对的挑战来讲是一个较实际的解决办法——这样是完全合法的,并且将会对促进中国人民对信息的访问非常有意义。我们非常希望中国政府能尊重我们的决定,尽管 我们非常清楚这可能随时会导致对我们服务的封锁。因此我们会非常仔细地监视访问问题,并且我们设立了这个新的页面每天更新以便每个人都能看到哪些服务在中国是可以访问的。

In terms of Google’s wider business operations, we intend to continue R&D work in China and also to maintain a sales presence there, though the size of the sales team will obviously be partially dependent on the ability of mainland Chinese users to access Google.com.hk. Finally, we would like to make clear that all these decisions have been driven and implemented by our executives in the United States, and that none of our employees in China can, or should, be held responsible for them. Despite all the uncertainty and difficulties they have faced since we made our announcement in January, they have continued to focus on serving our Chinese users and customers. We are immensely proud of them.

对于Google扩大商业运作而言,我们有意继续我们在中国的研究与测试工作,并在那里保留一支销售团队,尽管这支销售队伍的大小明显地会部分取决于中国 大陆用户是否能够访问Google.com.hk。最后,我们要声 明我们所有的这些决定都是由在美国的执行者们推动与实施的,我们中国的雇员没有任何人能够或者应该对其负责。从我们于二月份发表的通知开始,不管他们面对多大的不确定性和困难性,他们都在坚持聚焦于服务我们的中国用户和客户。我们为他们深深地感到自豪。

Posted by David Drummond, SVP, Corporate Development and Chief Legal Officer

 

google004

Google忍无可忍,无须再忍!

我曾经说劝Google不要在这个国家发展了,但今天它真的要重新考虑在中国的发展了,还是让人心里不是滋味。唉,忍无可忍,无须再忍!

以下内容引自Google官方博客,我作了翻译以便大家阅读。

A new approach to China
对中国的新举措

Like many other well-known organizations, we face cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google. However, it soon became clear that what at first appeared to be solely a security incident–albeit a significant one–was something quite different.
跟其它很多知名组织一样,我们都要面对经常发生的不同程度的攻击。就在12月中旬,我们探测到了一次来自中国的非常复杂的、针对我们的企业基础架构的攻击,最终导致Google的知识产权被盗。然而,很快事情就变得很清楚了,这个起初看似是单一的安全事故的事情——尽管非常严重——其实是一件非常不同的事件。

First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses–including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors–have been similarly targeted. We are currently in the process of notifying those companies, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities.
首先,这次攻击不止是针对Google。我们调查的部分结果发现,至少有20家各个行业的公司——包括互联网、金融、技术、媒体和化工——都成为了相同的目标。我们现在正在通知这些公司,同时我们也正在和美国权威人士一起调查。

Second, we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves.
第二,我们有证据表明攻击者的主要目标是入侵中国人权活动人士的Gmail帐户。基于目前的调查我们相信它们的攻击没有得逞。只有两个Gmail帐户被入侵,并且攻击活动仅限于帐户信息(例如帐户创建日期)和邮件的主题行,而邮件内容本身并未受影响。

Third, as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based Gmail users who are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties. These accounts have not been accessed through any security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on the users’ computers.
第三,通过这次调查的一部分(但不是针对攻击Google的事件)我们发现,许多基于美国、中国和欧洲的提倡中国人权的Gmail用户会定期被第三方入侵。这些帐户没有被通过对Google的任何安全冲击而侵入,但很可能是通过网络钓鱼陷阱或者是用户计算机上的恶意软件。

We have already used information gained from this attack to make infrastructure and architectural improvements that enhance security for Google and for our users. In terms of individual users, we would advise people to deploy reputable anti-virus and anti-spyware programs on their computers, to install patches for their operating systems and to update their web browsers. Always be cautious when clicking on links appearing in instant messages and emails, or when asked to share personal information like passwords online. You can read more here about our cyber-security recommendations. People wanting to learn more about these kinds of attacks can read this U.S. government report (PDF), Nart Villeneuve’s blog and this presentation on the GhostNet spying incident.
我们已经利用从这次攻击获得的信息进行了基础设施与架构的改进,为Google和我们的用户增强了安全性。就用户而言,我们建议在他们的计算机上部署知名的杀毒软件和反间谍软件,对操作系统安装补丁,并且升级他们的网页浏览器。在点击即时聊天工具和邮件里出现的链接或者在线被问及要共享其个人信息(如密码)时,一定要谨慎。你可以点击这里了解更多关于我们的网络安全建议。想要了解更多关于这些攻击的人可以阅读这个美国政府的报告(PDF)、Nart Villeneuve’s blog这个在GhostNet上的间谍活动的演示。

We have taken the unusual step of sharing information about these attacks with a broad audience not just because of the security and human rights implications of what we have unearthed, but also because this information goes to the heart of a much bigger global debate about freedom of speech. In the last two decades, China’s economic reform programs and its citizens’ entrepreneurial flair have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty. Indeed, this great nation is at the heart of much economic progress and development in the world today.
像这样如此大范围地共享这些攻击的信息是我们迈出的不寻常的一步。这不仅是因为我们的发现对安全与人权所产生的影响,更是因为这个信息涉及到了更大的全球性的对于言论自由的辩论。在过去的二十年里,中国的经济改革政策和其公民的企业家才能让数亿中国人脱离了贫穷。确实,今天这个伟大的国家正处在世界经济进程与发展的中心。

We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. At the time we made clear that “we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China.”
我们于2006年1月启动了Google.cn,带着这样的信念:提升中国人民对信息的获取和拥有一个更加开放的互联网所带来的利益比我们同意审查一部分搜索结果所带来的不适更重要。在那时我们很清楚地表示过“我们会小心翼翼地监视中国的情况,包括新的法律及其它对我们的服务的限制。如果我们确定我们无法达到所描述的目标,我们就会毫不犹豫地重新考虑我们对中国的举措。”

These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered–combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web–have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.
这些攻击和它们所揭露的监控(结合过去一年来对网络言论的进一步限制)让我们得出一个结论:我们应当重新检查在中国进行商业运作的可行性。我们已经决定我们已不再愿意继续审查Google.cn的搜索结果,并且接下来的几星期里我们将与中国政府讨论在法律允许的范围内运作一个不过滤的搜索引擎,如果有可能的话。我们认识到这可能会意味着不得不关闭Google.cn,并且很可能还有我们在中国的办公室。

The decision to review our business operations in China has been incredibly hard, and we know that it will have potentially far-reaching consequences. We want to make clear that this move was driven by our executives in the United States, without the knowledge or involvement of our employees in China who have worked incredibly hard to make Google.cn the success it is today. We are committed to working responsibly to resolve the very difficult issues raised.
作出重新检查我们在中国的商业运作的决定是极其艰难的,并且我们知道这将会导致潜在的深远的后果。我们要澄清这样的举动是我们在美国的执行者们所推动的,我们在中国的员工并不知悉也没有参与,他们通过无法想象的努力工作才造就了Google.cn今天的成就。我们决心要负责任地解决所导致的非常坚难的后果。

Posted by David Drummond, SVP, Corporate Development and Chief Legal Officer
发布者:David Drummond,高级副总裁、企业发展与首席法律官

学习五笔远比学习拼音输入法简单

一直在用极点五笔,觉得是我用得最顺手的一个五笔输入法。两三个月前忽然觉得有点腻了,就换了一个搜狗五笔,主要是看界面挺与时俱进的。今天一天头疼得很,可能着凉了,然后感觉看搜狗五笔很不顺眼。这两天在google wave里用搜狗五笔还打不进去字,于是决定换掉它。

周围一直也没有使用五笔的战友,所以也没有与人交流过最好的五笔输入法是什么。于是google了一下“最好 五笔”,发现极品五笔在第一位,于是就下载了。这篇博文看到这里一直是用极品五笔打的,到目前为止,觉得还行。比起极点五笔有些不好用,可能是使用习惯的问题,先用一段时间再说。

正当这样想着,无意在搜索结果的第一页最下面看到这样一个标题《现在的初学者最好别选五笔输入法》,是李笑来在1月2号写的。我向来觉得这位李老师挺不错的,于是就打开了这篇文章,看看李老师是什么观点。

文中把拼音输入法与五笔输入法做了比较,提出了“五笔只有在‘看到什么打什么’的时候才有一些优势”、“五笔用户在边想编写的情况下思维经常会被‘回忆编码’所中断”、“五笔相对于拼音来看是很难学的”等理由,建议初学者最好别选五笔输入法。

没想到我看这篇文章的时候,这个讨论输入法的文章竟然已有252条comments了。看了一会儿大家的评论后我也想说点儿,不过人太多了,还是来我自己的地盘谈谈我的一些看法与建议吧。

1、“五笔只有在‘看到什么打什么’的时候才有一些优势”、“五笔用户在边想边写的情况下思维经常会被‘回忆编码’所中断”

在“看到什么打什么”的时候五笔是有优势的,我认同,给五笔加一分。说“回忆编码”会打断思维我也认同,但是如同几位评论者所说的,这种情况在拼音输入法中也是存在的,用五笔回忆的是字形>>编码,用拼音回忆的是发音>>编码,两者应该说是差不多吧,五笔与拼音打平。那综上两点,结论应该是五笔比拼音更有优势一些。

不过,我其实不在乎哪个好哪个不好,也不提出孰高孰低的观点。我就说说我自己对“回忆编码”打断思维这一问题的解决办法吧。很简单,把输入法设置为五笔与拼音混合输入的模式就好了。写到这儿发现极品五笔没有这个功能,又立即换到极点了。在极点五笔里,一般默认就是“五笔拼音”模式。搜狗五笔里也可以设置,不过有一点让人不爽,在安装的时候如果我选五笔与拼音混合的模式时,提示是适合初学者。我从小学五年级学会之后就一直在用五笔,输入速度一般情况下也是六、七十字每分钟左右,这还是初学者吗?反正我就是用这个方法来解决的,目前由于输入法打断思维的情况极少出现。

2、“五笔相对于拼音来看是很难学的”

这是相当流行的一个不学五笔的理由。并且由此误导了不少学习五笔的人。所谓的难,主要在记字根与拆字这两点上。然而我以前在海豚俱乐部开设过计算机课程,其中也有五笔的教学。我根据自己的学习经验,在不用记字根与拆字的前提下成功地让我的学生达到输入速度七十多字每分钟。五笔的学习其实特别简单,如果我们的学校教育中没有拼音教学的话,学习五笔输入法会比拼音输入法简单得多。大多数人用拼音输入法觉得好像是不用学就会了,这其实是因为我们早就学会了拼音。学习拼音输入法的前提是会写中文+会拼音,而学习五笔其实只需要会写中文就可以了,所以学习五笔付出的真正成本要低于拼音输入法。

那我也跟大家分享一下这个不记字根、不学拆字的五笔输入练习法吧。

咱们倒过来,从已经能够熟练使用五笔的人说起。大家应该有这样的体验,在打字的时候是不会想字根是什么的,也不去想这个字是怎么拆的。当想要打一个字的时候,相应的手指会有一种本能的好像是发痒的感觉。比如我一想起我的姓——“赵”,我的两根食指与左手的小指就会有感觉,于是会自动地先左手食指敲F、右手食指敲H、左手小指敲Q,最后习惯性地按下空格,“赵”字就打出来了。在这个过程中其实连FHQ这三个字母都没有想到,只是手指好像是自动在按键。这其实就是一种条件反射了,每个字与手指的运动都建立了相对应的条件反射

我直接从这个结果出发,用下面的方法训练学生:

  1. 先练好基本指法,不要用两根食指在那里戳,这无论对于拼音输入法还是五笔输入法都有好处;
  2. 建立字根的条件反射:利用五笔字型的练习软件来练习,最好是屏幕上有键盘图,按了键之后屏幕上相应的键会亮。练的时候不看键盘,只看屏幕,用“摸”的方式去找对键位;
  3. 由简单到复杂建立各个汉字的条件反射:在练习软件中开启提示功能,按照键名汉字、一级、二级、三级简码的顺序练习。练的时候看着屏幕上的提示,注意不是编码的提示,而是高亮显示相应的键。练的时候也用“摸”键的方式练习;
  4. 成功。

有人可能会说,这办法太笨了吧,建立每个汉字的条件反射,汉字那么多,没练过的不是就不会打了吗?不是,因为字根有了条件反射,大多数汉字也有了条件反射,人的大脑在潜意识中已经建立了拆字原则了。没有练习过的字同样也能快速地如同条件反射般打出来。

我训练的学生不会背字根表,但打字速度比我还快。并且我的学生用这个方法教别人,也是同样的效果。练习时间一般不超过一个月。这可比小时候学了一两年的拼音付出的代价少多了。

因此,我说学习五笔比学习拼音输入法简单。这个过程只是练习手指的条件反射过程而已。但是现实情况是我们大多数人都已学习过拼音了,所以练习五笔与练习拼音的难度可以说是差不多了。于是我提出跟李笑来老师不同的看法,初学者学习五笔与拼音都差不多,选择自己喜欢的吧,最好将来把两样都学会。