谷歌,墙那边再见!

真的要说再见了。不过说实话,平时上网都翻墙,几乎从来没有用过G.cn。并不想说G.cn做得不好,而是在这样的国家,你是不能期待它能做到像Google.com那样的。
Farewell! G.cn. See you on the other side of the wall!

A new approach to China: an update
对中国的新举措:更新

3/22/2010 12:03:00 PM

On January 12, we announced on this blog that Google and more than twenty other U.S. companies had been the victims of a sophisticated cyber attack originating from China, and that during our investigation into these attacks we had uncovered evidence to suggest that the Gmail accounts of dozens of human rights activists connected with China were being routinely accessed by third parties, most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on their computers. We also made clear that these attacks and the surveillance they uncovered—combined with attempts over the last year to further limit free speech on the web in China including the persistent blocking of websites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google Docs and Blogger—had led us to conclude that we could no longer continue censoring our results on Google.cn.

在1月12日,我们在这个博客上宣布Google和其它二十多家美国公遭遇到了来自中国的高手段的网络攻击。在调查这些攻击的过程中我们发现了很多证据表明大量与中国有关的人权活动家的Gmail帐户经常被第三方登入,大多像是通过钓鱼诈骗或者被置于他们电脑上的流氓软件。我们同样也表明这些攻击以及由此揭露出来的监控行为——再加上在过去的一年中为进一步限制网络言论自由而对像Facebook、Twitter、YouTube、Google Docs和Blogger进行的持续封锁——导致我们做出决定,不再对我们Google.cn上的搜索结果进行审查。

So earlier today we stopped censoring our search services—Google Search, Google News, and Google Images—on Google.cn. Users visiting Google.cn are now being redirected to Google.com.hk, where we are offering uncensored search in simplified Chinese, specifically designed for users in mainland China and delivered via our servers in Hong Kong. Users in Hong Kong will continue to receive their existing uncensored, traditional Chinese service, also from Google.com.hk. Due to the increased load on our Hong Kong servers and the complicated nature of these changes, users may see some slowdown in service or find some products temporarily inaccessible as we switch everything over.

所以,在今天早些时候我们停止了对Google.cn上的搜索服务——Google Search、Google News和Google Images——的审查。访问Google.cn的用户将会被转向Google.com.hk,在那里我们提供不经审查的简体中文搜索,通过我们在香港的服务器专门为来自中国大陆的用户服务。香港的用户将会继续收到他们原有的Google.com.hk未经审查的繁体中文服务。由于香港服务器所增加的负荷和这些变化的复杂性,在我们转移所有东西的过程中用户可能会发现服务速度有些变缓或者有些产品暂时不能访问。

Figuring out how to make good on our promise to stop censoring search on Google.cn has been hard. We want as many people in the world as possible to have access to our services, including users in mainland China, yet the Chinese government has been crystal clear throughout our discussions that self-censorship is a non-negotiable legal requirement. We believe this new approach of providing uncensored search in simplified Chinese from Google.com.hk is a sensible solution to the challenges we’ve faced—it’s entirely legal and will meaningfully increase access to information for people in China. We very much hope that the Chinese government respects our decision, though we are well aware that it could at any time block access to our services. We will therefore be carefully monitoring access issues, and have created this new web page, which we will update regularly each day, so that everyone can see which Google services are available in China.

弄清楚怎样实现我们对Google.cn的搜索不进行审查的承诺是非常艰难的。我们希望全世界更多的人能访问我们的服务,包括来自中国大陆的用户,然而中 国政府在我们谈判的过程中非常清楚地表明自我审查是一个不可谈判的我们条件。我们相信这个通过Google.com.hk提供简体中文不经审查的搜索的新举措对我们所面 对的挑战来讲是一个较实际的解决办法——这样是完全合法的,并且将会对促进中国人民对信息的访问非常有意义。我们非常希望中国政府能尊重我们的决定,尽管 我们非常清楚这可能随时会导致对我们服务的封锁。因此我们会非常仔细地监视访问问题,并且我们设立了这个新的页面每天更新以便每个人都能看到哪些服务在中国是可以访问的。

In terms of Google’s wider business operations, we intend to continue R&D work in China and also to maintain a sales presence there, though the size of the sales team will obviously be partially dependent on the ability of mainland Chinese users to access Google.com.hk. Finally, we would like to make clear that all these decisions have been driven and implemented by our executives in the United States, and that none of our employees in China can, or should, be held responsible for them. Despite all the uncertainty and difficulties they have faced since we made our announcement in January, they have continued to focus on serving our Chinese users and customers. We are immensely proud of them.

对于Google扩大商业运作而言,我们有意继续我们在中国的研究与测试工作,并在那里保留一支销售团队,尽管这支销售队伍的大小明显地会部分取决于中国 大陆用户是否能够访问Google.com.hk。最后,我们要声 明我们所有的这些决定都是由在美国的执行者们推动与实施的,我们中国的雇员没有任何人能够或者应该对其负责。从我们于二月份发表的通知开始,不管他们面对多大的不确定性和困难性,他们都在坚持聚焦于服务我们的中国用户和客户。我们为他们深深地感到自豪。

Posted by David Drummond, SVP, Corporate Development and Chief Legal Officer

 

google004

Google忍无可忍,无须再忍!

我曾经说劝Google不要在这个国家发展了,但今天它真的要重新考虑在中国的发展了,还是让人心里不是滋味。唉,忍无可忍,无须再忍!

以下内容引自Google官方博客,我作了翻译以便大家阅读。

A new approach to China
对中国的新举措

Like many other well-known organizations, we face cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google. However, it soon became clear that what at first appeared to be solely a security incident–albeit a significant one–was something quite different.
跟其它很多知名组织一样,我们都要面对经常发生的不同程度的攻击。就在12月中旬,我们探测到了一次来自中国的非常复杂的、针对我们的企业基础架构的攻击,最终导致Google的知识产权被盗。然而,很快事情就变得很清楚了,这个起初看似是单一的安全事故的事情——尽管非常严重——其实是一件非常不同的事件。

First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses–including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors–have been similarly targeted. We are currently in the process of notifying those companies, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities.
首先,这次攻击不止是针对Google。我们调查的部分结果发现,至少有20家各个行业的公司——包括互联网、金融、技术、媒体和化工——都成为了相同的目标。我们现在正在通知这些公司,同时我们也正在和美国权威人士一起调查。

Second, we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves.
第二,我们有证据表明攻击者的主要目标是入侵中国人权活动人士的Gmail帐户。基于目前的调查我们相信它们的攻击没有得逞。只有两个Gmail帐户被入侵,并且攻击活动仅限于帐户信息(例如帐户创建日期)和邮件的主题行,而邮件内容本身并未受影响。

Third, as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based Gmail users who are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties. These accounts have not been accessed through any security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on the users’ computers.
第三,通过这次调查的一部分(但不是针对攻击Google的事件)我们发现,许多基于美国、中国和欧洲的提倡中国人权的Gmail用户会定期被第三方入侵。这些帐户没有被通过对Google的任何安全冲击而侵入,但很可能是通过网络钓鱼陷阱或者是用户计算机上的恶意软件。

We have already used information gained from this attack to make infrastructure and architectural improvements that enhance security for Google and for our users. In terms of individual users, we would advise people to deploy reputable anti-virus and anti-spyware programs on their computers, to install patches for their operating systems and to update their web browsers. Always be cautious when clicking on links appearing in instant messages and emails, or when asked to share personal information like passwords online. You can read more here about our cyber-security recommendations. People wanting to learn more about these kinds of attacks can read this U.S. government report (PDF), Nart Villeneuve’s blog and this presentation on the GhostNet spying incident.
我们已经利用从这次攻击获得的信息进行了基础设施与架构的改进,为Google和我们的用户增强了安全性。就用户而言,我们建议在他们的计算机上部署知名的杀毒软件和反间谍软件,对操作系统安装补丁,并且升级他们的网页浏览器。在点击即时聊天工具和邮件里出现的链接或者在线被问及要共享其个人信息(如密码)时,一定要谨慎。你可以点击这里了解更多关于我们的网络安全建议。想要了解更多关于这些攻击的人可以阅读这个美国政府的报告(PDF)、Nart Villeneuve’s blog这个在GhostNet上的间谍活动的演示。

We have taken the unusual step of sharing information about these attacks with a broad audience not just because of the security and human rights implications of what we have unearthed, but also because this information goes to the heart of a much bigger global debate about freedom of speech. In the last two decades, China’s economic reform programs and its citizens’ entrepreneurial flair have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty. Indeed, this great nation is at the heart of much economic progress and development in the world today.
像这样如此大范围地共享这些攻击的信息是我们迈出的不寻常的一步。这不仅是因为我们的发现对安全与人权所产生的影响,更是因为这个信息涉及到了更大的全球性的对于言论自由的辩论。在过去的二十年里,中国的经济改革政策和其公民的企业家才能让数亿中国人脱离了贫穷。确实,今天这个伟大的国家正处在世界经济进程与发展的中心。

We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. At the time we made clear that “we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China.”
我们于2006年1月启动了Google.cn,带着这样的信念:提升中国人民对信息的获取和拥有一个更加开放的互联网所带来的利益比我们同意审查一部分搜索结果所带来的不适更重要。在那时我们很清楚地表示过“我们会小心翼翼地监视中国的情况,包括新的法律及其它对我们的服务的限制。如果我们确定我们无法达到所描述的目标,我们就会毫不犹豫地重新考虑我们对中国的举措。”

These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered–combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web–have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.
这些攻击和它们所揭露的监控(结合过去一年来对网络言论的进一步限制)让我们得出一个结论:我们应当重新检查在中国进行商业运作的可行性。我们已经决定我们已不再愿意继续审查Google.cn的搜索结果,并且接下来的几星期里我们将与中国政府讨论在法律允许的范围内运作一个不过滤的搜索引擎,如果有可能的话。我们认识到这可能会意味着不得不关闭Google.cn,并且很可能还有我们在中国的办公室。

The decision to review our business operations in China has been incredibly hard, and we know that it will have potentially far-reaching consequences. We want to make clear that this move was driven by our executives in the United States, without the knowledge or involvement of our employees in China who have worked incredibly hard to make Google.cn the success it is today. We are committed to working responsibly to resolve the very difficult issues raised.
作出重新检查我们在中国的商业运作的决定是极其艰难的,并且我们知道这将会导致潜在的深远的后果。我们要澄清这样的举动是我们在美国的执行者们所推动的,我们在中国的员工并不知悉也没有参与,他们通过无法想象的努力工作才造就了Google.cn今天的成就。我们决心要负责任地解决所导致的非常坚难的后果。

Posted by David Drummond, SVP, Corporate Development and Chief Legal Officer
发布者:David Drummond,高级副总裁、企业发展与首席法律官